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EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
GOVERNMENT LAND TRANSFERS TO PRIVATE ENTITIES
Michael Pest*
INTRODUCTION
Among the 1.6 million acres of southern California’s Mojave National
Preserve stands a small cross, erected nearly a century ago as a memorial to
veterans who died in World War I.  Located in a remote site in the desert atop1
an outcropping known as Sunrise Rock, the cross, standing between five and
eight feet tall,  may appear to be of little significance to the average passerby.2
However, this seemingly inconsequential monument may have substantial
implications for the federal government’s ability to transfer land to private
entities. The location of the cross in the federally-owned Preserve has sparked
widespread debate over whether it violates the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause, which guarantees that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”  The Establishment Clause is3
generally interpreted to guarantee citizens the right to be free from the
government’s endorsement of a particular religion.  Opponents of the cross4
* J.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2011; B.A. 2006, Northwestern
University.
1. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (holding that neither a state nor the
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have sought its removal for more than a decade, arguing that its location on
the Preserve constitutes governmental endorsement of Christianity.5
The case of Salazar v. Buono,  which was decided by the United States6
Supreme Court on April 28, 2010, is a culmination of this decade-long legal
battle.  The central issue in this case was whether the constitutional violation7
created by the government’s endorsement of a particular religion is
meaningfully eradicated by its proposal to transfer ownership of the patch of
land on which the cross stands to a private entity.  In this case, the government8
attempted to remedy the constitutional violation by transferring the land to a
local veteran’s group.  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the9
transfer was valid and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, thereby resolving a split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals.10
The decisions of the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals over
the years demonstrate the divide between the two Circuits on this issue. The
Seventh Circuit, in cases such as Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v.
City of Marshfield, has repeatedly held that, “absent unusual circumstances,
a sale of real property conveying a message endorsing religion is an effective
way for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion.”11
Thus, absent unusual circumstances, a governmental transaction is presumed
to be an effective remedy for an Establishment Clause violation. The Ninth
Circuit, however, in the Buono line of cases, has viewed such transactions
with greater scrutiny and has declined to adopt such a presumption when this
type of case arises.  Proponents of the Ninth Circuit’s views on this issue cite12
federal government can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another).
5. See generally Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
6. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
7. Israel Drazin, The Divisive Mojave Cross, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/oct/05/opinion/oe-drazin5.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
11. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, WI, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.
2000).
12. This issue first arose in the Central District Court of California. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp.
2d 1202, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The District Court determined that the cross violated the Establishment
Clause, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004). Buono then brought
another action in District Court alleging that the land transfer itself violated the Establishment Clause, and
the Court ruled that the transfer violated a permanent injunction against the display of the cross in the
Preserve. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling.
Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007). One year later, the Ninth Circuit issued the amended
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the importance of upholding the Establishment Clause and preventing the
government from endorsing a particular position.  Supporters of the Seventh13
Circuit’s holdings, on the other hand, demonstrate concern over the Ninth
Circuit’s supposed disregard of binding Supreme Court precedent, and also
point to the potential implications that a restriction on the government’s ability
to transfer land that it owns may have for the private land owners engaged in
such transactions.  Thus, the particular type of transaction at issue in Salazar14
v. Buono raises First Amendment as well as private property concerns. In
rendering a decision in Salazar v. Buono, therefore, the Court was faced with
the task of effectively balancing these two important competing interests.
This comment begins with a discussion of the historical background of
and rationale for the Establishment Clause, and continues with an examination
of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Clause from the twentieth
through the twenty-first century. Part II of this comment discusses the Seventh
Circuit and Ninth Circuit’s varying approaches to Establishment Clause cases
dealing with the transfer of land from a governmental body to a private entity.
Specifically, Part II A. analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in deciding the
seminal Freedom from Religion Foundation  and Mercier v. Fraternal Order15
of Eagles  cases. Part II B. discusses the contrasting rationale of the Ninth16
Circuit in dealing with these types of cases, particularly by examining the
Buono cases, the line of cases leading up to the Salazar v. Buono. Part II C.
discusses the Supreme Court’s ruling in Salazar v. Buono. In Part III, the
comment analyzes the competing interests at stake in the Seventh and Ninth
Circuit approaches, their relative importance, and the balance that must be
struck by the Court in order to adequately address both concerns.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution reads,“Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”  The development17
of the Establishment Clause most likely arose out of hostility towards the
opinion. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 2008).
13. See generally Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 2008).
14. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)
(noting that the VFW to which the land containing the Sunrise Rock Cross was sold would be forced to
sacrifice its private property rights due to the government’s constitutional violation under the majority’s
approach).
15. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 203 F.3d at 491.
16. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Church of England in the eighteenth century.  Until 1784, any priest18
belonging to the Anglican tradition—the official state religion in several
colonies—had been ordained in London.  By the time of the American19
Revolution, Anglican priests were held in high suspicion and the framers were
reluctant to establish anything resembling an official Church of England in the
United States.  An “establishment of religion” in the historic sense is the20
creation of an established church, or one that is supported by civil authority.21
Thus, the First Amendment has generally been interpreted to prohibit the
establishment of a national religion by Congress, as well as the preference of
one religion over another.
For the nation’s first 150 years, the Supreme Court had very few
opportunities to interpret the Establishment Clause because the First
Amendment had not yet been applied to the states.  In 1947, however, the22
Court ruled in Everson v. Board of Education that the Establishment Clause
applied to the states as well as to the federal government.  In Everson, the23
court analyzed the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that authorized its
local school districts to make rules and contracts for the transportation of
children to and from schools.  The statute authorized a school board to24
reimburse parents for money they spent on bus transportation for their
children, but part of this money was for the payment of transportation of some
children in the community to Catholic parochial schools.  Despite upholding25
the statute’s constitutionality, Justice Black, after providing a detailed list of
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause, concluded that the New
Jersey statute should be considered in accordance with these First Amendment
limitations.  After this ruling, all government action, whether at the federal,26
18. Tom Head, The Establishment Clause: What Does The First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause Really Mean?, http://civilliberty.about.com/od/religiousliberty/a/establishment.htm.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. WILLIAM H. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA FROM
COLONIAL DAYS TO THE SCHOOL PRAYER CONTROVERSY, at x–xi (1964).
22. Religious Liberty in Public Life, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.firstamendmentcenter
.org/rel_liberty/establishment/index.aspx.
23. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 15–16:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
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state or local level, became subject to the restrictions imposed by the
Establishment Clause.27
In the years following the Everson decision, the Court heard a number of
Establishment Clause cases and began to develop its modern interpretation of
the clause. In the influential 1971 case Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court
established a three-part test for determining whether a particular governmental
action constitutes an Establishment Clause violation.  At issue in this case28
were two state laws: a Pennsylvania statute known as the Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and a Rhode Island statute known
as the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act.  Both of these statutes sought to29
supplement the salaries of teachers in non-public schools with the use of state
funds.  In analyzing the constitutionality of the statutes, the Court concluded30
that “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. . . .
[and] the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”  Under the Lemon test, if a statute violates any of these three31
principles, it must be struck down under the Establishment Clause.  In32
determining whether the statutes in question fostered an excessive
entanglement with religion, the Court examined “the character and purposes
of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority.”  The Court struck down both statutes and based its33
holding on a number of factors, including the duty of the Rhode Island
schools’ teachers to stimulate interest in religious vocations and missionary
work; the fact that the Pennsylvania statute provided state financial aid
directly to church-related schools; the requirement that both states examine
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
27. Supra note 22.
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
29. Id. at 602.
30. Id. (The Pennsylvania statute authorized reimbursement to nonpublic schools for teachers’
salaries who taught secular materials in such schools, while the Rhode Island statute provided a fifteen
percent salary supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools at which the average per pupil expenditure on
secular education was below the average in public schools. In both states, the majority of these funds were
spent on Catholic schools.).
31. Id. at 612–13.
32. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980).
33. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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schools’ records in order to determine how much of the total expenditures
were attributable to secular education and how much to religious activity; and
the divisive political potential of both state programs.34
The Court revisited the issue several years later in Lynch v. Donnelly, this
time examining whether a Christmas display in a public area which contained
a Nativity scene violated the Establishment Clause.  With its ruling in Lynch,35
the Court modified the approach of the Lemon Court by promulgating the
endorsement test.  The Lynch Court narrowed the scope of the Lemon test,36
holding that the crucial inquiry in determining if an Establishment Clause
violation exists is whether a government practice has the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion.  Thus, under this analysis, a violation only occurs in cases where the37
government is affirmatively endorsing religion.  In Lynch, the Court found38
that while the Nativity scene does have religious significance, the display
should be allowed to stand because the celebration of Christmas has long been
accepted by the western world and the United States government.39
Whether the Lemon test or the endorsement test promulgated by the
Lynch Court is applied is an unsettled issue and therefore depends in large part
on the individual views of the judges hearing a particular case.  There are40
three competing views concerning how far the protections of the
Establishment Clause should extend.  The first of these views is strict41
separation, which advocates a complete separation of church and state, and a
secular government.  Proponents of the second view of the Establishment42
Clause’s scope argue that the Clause commands that the government should
be neutral with regard to religion, neither favoring one religion over another
34. Id. at 616–22.
35. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
36. Kassandra J. Slaven, Comment, A Cross-Examination of the Establishment Clause and Boise’s
Table Rock Cross, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 651, 657 (2009).
37. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
38. Slaven, supra note 36, at 657. 
39. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 669 (holding that “it would be ironic if the inclusion of the crèche in the
display, as part of a celebration of an event acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in
this country by the people, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so ‘taint’
the exhibition as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive
symbol while hymns and carols are sung and played in public places including schools, and while Congress
and state legislatures open public sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction contrary to our history
and our holdings.”).
40. Slaven, supra note 36, at 656–57.
41. Id. at 658.
42. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should be Separate, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2193, 2196 (2008).
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nor favoring secularism over religion or vice versa.  Proponents of the third43
view, known as the accommodationist perspective, believe that the
government violates the Establishment Clause only if it literally establishes
a church or coerces religious participation.44
In recent years, the Supreme Court has not been explicitly clear on which
interpretation of the Establishment Clause it supports.  This ambiguity of the45
Court’s recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence is made apparent by the
rulings in two cases decided in 2005, Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary Co.
v. ACLU of Kentucky. In Van Orden, a dispute arose over the constitutionality
of a six-foot-high monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments that stood
on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol.  In ruling that the monument did46
not violate the Establishment Clause, the majority rejected the Lemon test,
explaining that its “analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and
by our Nation’s history.”  The majority concluded that, since there have been47
official acknowledgments by all three branches of government of religion’s
role in American life, and since the Ten Commandments have undeniable
historical meaning in addition to their religious meaning, the display did not
violate the Establishment Clause.  The Court distinguished this case from48
Stone v. Graham, which struck down a Kentucky statute requiring the posting
of the Ten Commandments in every classroom.  The rationale behind this49
distinction was that the Texas monument employs a more passive use of the
Ten Commandments than was the case in Stone, where the text of the Ten
Commandments confronted elementary school students every day in the
classroom.50
In contrast, in McCreary Co. v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Supreme Court
held that the display of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky courthouses
constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause.  The county requested51
that the Court abandon the secular purpose test of Lemon because the true
“purpose” of a statute is unknowable.  Justice Souter, writing for the52
43. Id. at 2197.
44. Id. at 2197–98.
45. See generally Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Co. v. ACLU of Kentucky,
545 U.S. 844 (2005).
46. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
47. Id. at 686.
48. Id. at 688–90.
49. Stone, 449 U.S. at 39.
50. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691.
51. McCreary Co., 545 U.S. at 881.
52. Id. at 859.
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majority, upheld Lemon’s secular purpose test and concluded that no such
purpose existed in this case.  Despite the fact that the courthouses modified53
the display several times in an attempt to bring it within constitutional
requirements, the Court held that each of these displays was improper, noting
that “[a]n observer would probably suspect the Counties of reaching for any
way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses constitutionally
required to embody religious neutrality.”54
While the varying results reached by the Supreme Court demonstrate the
muddled nature of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, disagreement among
scholars, over both the requirements imposed by the Establishment Clause and
the importance of the doctrine, also helps to illustrate this point. Many
scholars advocate a strict separation viewpoint, while emphasizing the
continuing importance of the Establishment Clause in our country.  One55
scholar, emphasizing the continuing importance of the Clause, notes that
“given the extraordinary religious diversity of our Nation, the Establishment
Clause functions to depoliticize religion; it thereby helps to diffuse a
potentially explosive situation.”  Professor Erwin Chemerinsky adheres to a56
similar viewpoint, arguing that strict separation is desirable because “it is a
way of ensuring that we can all feel that it is ‘our’ government, whatever our
religion or lack of religion. If government becomes aligned with a particular
religion or religions, those of other beliefs are made to feel like outsiders.”57
This is especially important, Professor Chemerinsky argues, given the fact that
today the United States is a far more religiously diverse society than the
Framers could have ever imagined.58
In contrast, several commentators maintain that the Establishment Clause,
while requiring some separation, does not require a complete disconnection
between church and state.  Many commentators and religious leaders59
maintain an even more extreme attitude opposing separation, by downplaying
the significance of the Establishment Clause and insisting that the United
53. Id. at 861 (holding that examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation for every
American appellate court, and governmental purpose is a key element of a good deal of constitutional
doctrine).
54. Id. at 848.
55. See LEONARD WILLIAMS LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, at ix–xvi (1986).
56. Id. at ix.
57. Chemerensky, supra note 42, at 2206.
58. Id. at 2205.
59. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Why ‘Separation’ Is Not the Key to Church-State Relations,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 18, 1989, at 43, http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=804.
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States is a “Christian nation” whose laws and government should reflect that
“fact.”  The current issue involving the sale of land by a governmental entity60
and the Establishment Clause implications that such transactions have are a
reflection of this widespread and continuing debate.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE SALE OF LAND AS AN
EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATIONS
An issue that has arisen recently in Establishment Clause cases is whether
the transfer of land from a government agency to a private entity is an efficient
remedy for any potential Establishment Clause violations. For instance, at the
heart of Salazar v. Buono was a dispute over a cross located in the
government-owned Mojave National Preserve. In an attempt to keep the cross
at its current location atop Sunrise Rock, Congress passed a law instructing
the secretary of the interior to transfer ownership of Sunrise Rock and a
surrounding acre to a local chapter of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW),
a private entity, in order to avoid any Establishment Clause violation.61
Cases involving these types of land transfers have reached the Circuit
Courts in several instances, and, prior to the Court’s ruling in Salazar v.
Buono, a split existed between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits regarding their
constitutionality.  Recent Seventh Circuit decisions indicate that the transfer62
of land from the government to a private entity is an effective cure for an
establishment clause violation, absent any “unusual circumstances”
surrounding the transaction.  Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has viewed such63
transactions with greater scrutiny than the Seventh Circuit, holding in Buono
v. Kempthorne that it must “decline to adopt a presumption of the
effectiveness of a land sale to end a constitutional violation” as the Seventh
Circuit did in Marshfield.  Rather, the Court notes that “[t]he Supreme64
60. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV.
1071, 1108 (2002), available at http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/43_5/03_
TXT.htm.
61. Jesse Merriam, Salazar v. Buono: Can Government Give One Religion’s Symbol Prominence
in a Public Park?, PEW RESEARCH CENTER PUBLICATIONS, Sept. 24, 2009, available at http://pewresearch
.org/pubs/1353/salazar-buono-establishment-clause-religious-display.
62. See generally Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005) and Buono
v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008).
63. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 700 (citing Freedom from Religion Foundation, 203 F.3d at 491).
64. Buono, 502 F.3d at 759.
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Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence recognizes the need to conduct a
fact-specific inquiry in this area.”65
A. The Seventh Circuit Approach
Two relatively recent decisions issued by the Seventh Circuit that
demonstrate its approach to analyzing the constitutionality of land transfers
are Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield and Mercier
v. Fraternal Order of Eagles.
The first of these two cases, Marshfield, was decided by the court in
1999. The case centered on a fifteen-foot-tall, white marble statue of Jesus
Christ that was given as a gift from the Knights of Columbus to the city of
Marshfield, Wisconsin in 1959.  At the base of the statue was the inscription,66
in twelve-inch block letters, “Christ Guide Us On Our Way.”  After accepting67
the gift, the city of Marshfield placed the statue in an undeveloped, city-owned
property known as Wildwood Park.  Thirty-nine years later, in 1998, a local68
businessman and member of the Freedom from Religion Foundation objected
to the presence of the statue on public property and requested that the city
move the statue to private property.  The city refused this request, and69
eventually the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking injunctive
relief.  After the lawsuit was filed, the city sold a small section of the park to70
a private group of Marshfield citizens in order to circumvent any potential
constitutional violations.71
After the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed on the issue of whether the land sale was an effective
remedy for the Establishment Clause violation.  Despite the plaintiff’s72
arguments that the transaction was merely a “‘sweetheart deal’… concocted
to circumvent the government action requirement of the Establishment
Clause” and therefore constituted an endorsement of religion by the city, the
court found the transaction to be valid, citing the facts that the fund had
65. Id.
66. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 203 F.3d at 489.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The city sold 0.15 acres of land surrounding the statue to a group of Marshfield citizens known
as the Henry Praschak Memorial Fund, Inc. for a price of $21,560. The bid process met all Wisconsin
statutory requirements for the sale of public land. See id. at 489–90.
72. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 203 F.3d at 493.
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performed the necessary formalities to effect a transfer of property, paid a fair
price and assumed the traditional duties of ownership.  Thus, because there73
were no extraordinary circumstances that justified disregarding the sale for the
purposes of the city endorsing religion, the court concluded that the city did
not engage in government action endorsing religion by selling the property,
and thus the transfer was valid.74
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar result in the 2005 case of Mercier
v. Fraternal Order of Eagles.  At issue in this case was the location of a75
monument bearing an inscription of the Ten Commandments in a public park
in La Crosse, Wisconsin.  The statue was erected in 1965 by the Fraternal76
Order of Eagles, which was given permission by the city to install the
monument.  In 2002, after threats of lawsuits over the monument, the city77
council of La Crosse agreed to sell the monument to the Eagles along with a
twenty-foot by twenty-two-foot parcel of land under and surrounding the
monument.  Again, the Seventh Circuit found that this transaction lacked any78
“unusual circumstances,” and held that the transaction was a sufficient means
of ending the government endorsement of religion.  In its majority opinion,79
the court, citing the Marshfield opinion, provided examples of “the typical sort
of improprieties that might cause us to disregard a transaction.”  Unusual80
circumstances, according to the court, “would include a sale that did not
comply with applicable state law governing the sale of land by a municipality,
a sale to a straw purchaser that left the City with continuing power to exercise
the duties of ownership, or a sale well below fair market value resulting in a
gift to a religious organization.”  Absent these or any other strange81
circumstances, the court held the transfer of the land to be an effective method
for remedying an Establishment Clause violation.
These cases demonstrate the Seventh Circuit’s rather lenient view of land
transfers as an Establishment Clause violation remedy. The Seventh Circuit
presumes that such transfers are valid, absent unusual circumstances that
indicate a continuing government endorsement of religion. Based on the
Marshfield and Mercier opinions, it appears as though a particular
73. Id. at 491–92.
74. Id. at 493.
75. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 693.
76. Id. at 694.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 696.
79. Id. at 702–03.
80. Id. at 702.
81. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702.
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circumstance would have to be extremely unusual for the Seventh Circuit to
consider it sufficient to terminate an otherwise valid transaction. For example,
the court viewed the fact that the cities in both cases did not solicit alternative
bids for the lands at issue as inconsequential to the transaction’s validity.82
Based on these rulings, it is apparent that the Seventh Circuit’s approach to
these types of transactions is to generally uphold a transfer of land to a private
entity unless some sort of obvious, egregious misconduct occurs. As this
comment will demonstrate in the next section, the Ninth Circuit’s approach
has given substantially more scrutiny to these types of transactions.
B. The Ninth Circuit Approach
An analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s approach to Establishment Clause cases
involving a government sale of land requires an examination of the cases
leading up to Salazar v. Buono. The controversy at the center of Salazar began
in 2001, when Frank Buono, a former Assistant Superintendent of the Mojave
National Preserve, brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the
National Park Service’s (NPS) maintenance of the cross atop Sunrise Rock.83
The district court, applying the Lemon test, ruled that the presence of the cross
on federal land conveys a message of endorsement of religion, and granted
summary judgment to Buono and his co-plaintiffs.84
Prior to this decision, however, Congress designated the cross a national
memorial, and allocated federal funding to the NPS for the purpose of
installing a memorial plaque at the site.  Following the district court’s ruling85
that the statue be removed, Congress passed another law that banned the use
of federal dollars to remove the cross, in an attempt to ensure that the court’s
order was not carried out.  The NPS appealed the district court’s ruling, and86
while the appeal was still pending, Congress passed another law requiring the
secretary of the interior to transfer ownership of Sunrise Rock and a
surrounding acre to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).87
In 2004, prior to this transfer of the property, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s ruling, holding that the location of the statue in the Preserve
was unconstitutional despite the fact that the cross was erected and maintained
82. Id. at 703.
83. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
84. Id. at 1214–17.
85. Merriam, supra note 61.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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by private individuals, and was intended to serve as war memorial.88
Furthermore, the Court held that the relatively small size of the cross and its
remote location are of no consequence to its decision. Despite the short height
of the cross, the Court reasoned that this makes it no less likely to project a
message of government endorsement to a reasonable observer.  Furthermore,89
the Court held that the cross’s remote location was insignificant. The lack of
a government-owned building in the vicinity of the cross is irrelevant; the only
significant matter is that the cross sits on public park land, which “embod[ies]
the notion of government ownership as much as urban parkland, and the
remote location of Sunrise Rock does nothing to detract from that notion.”90
Despite the Ninth Circuit affirming that the statue was unconstitutional,
the NPS did not remove the statue, but rather took steps to transfer the land to
the VFW.  This action led Buono to file another lawsuit in district court, this91
time seeking an injunction on the transfer of the land from the NPS to the
VFW.  In that case, the district court again declared the statue92
unconstitutional, and enjoined the NPS from transferring the land.  In93
declaring the transfer invalid, the court determined that unusual circumstances
surrounded the transfer.  Specifically, the court cited to the fact that the NPS94
retained a reversionary interest in the property, that the decision to transfer the
land did not occur through the normal administrative process, and the history
of the government's efforts to preserve and maintain the Sunrise Rock cross
as unusual circumstances.95
Again, the NPS appealed this ruling to the Ninth Circuit, with the same
result.  In upholding the district court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit considered96
the same circumstances surrounding the transfer, and concluded that the
government engaged in “herculean efforts” to preserve the cross atop Sunrise
Rock.  Finally, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued an amended opinion, adding97
a footnote which explained that while the court agreed with the Seventh
Circuit’s approach of looking at these cases on a transaction by transaction
basis, it declined to adopt a presumption of the effectiveness of a land sale to
88. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2004).
89. Id. at 549.
90. Id.
91. Merriam, supra note 61.
92. Id.
93. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
94. Id. at 1182.
95. Id. at 1179–82.
96. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007).
97. Id. at 1085.
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end a constitutional violation.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit, while adopting the98
Seventh Circuit’s unusual circumstances test, views such transactions with far
more scrutiny than the Seventh Circuit.
C. The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Salazar v. Buono
On April 28, 2010, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
reversed the ruling of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the plurality, held that the District Court in Buono v.
Norton incorrectly enjoined the land transfer on the basis of suspicion of an
illicit governmental purpose, rather than on perception, which was the sole
basis for the 2002 injunction.  Justice Kennedy presumed that the 200299
injunction was valid, but suggested that he did not necessarily agree with the
ruling, stating that “[t]he goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not
require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm.”  Justice100
Alito, concurring in part and in the judgment, wrote that the actions taken by
Congress were appropriate, noting that the transfer would “eliminate any
perception of religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the cross
on federally owned land, while at the same time avoiding the disturbing
symbolism associated with the destruction of the historic monument.”  As101
a result, Justice Alito did not believe that it was necessary to remand the case
to the lower court.102
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented,
writing that “[a] Latin cross necessarily symbolizes one of the most important
tenets upon which believers in a benevolent Creator, as well as non-believers,
are known to differ.”  While Justice Stevens agreed that “the Nation should103
memorialize the service of those who fought and died in World War I,” he
held that “it cannot lawfully do so by continued endorsement of a starkly
sectarian message.”  In Justice Stevens’ view, the transfer would not end104
government endorsement of the cross because “after the transfer it would
continue to appear to any reasonable observer that the Government has
endorsed the cross,” since the government has designated it as a national
98. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 2008).
99. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010).
100. Id. at 1818.
101. Id. at 1823.
102. Id. at 1821.
103. Id. at 1828.
104. Id.
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memorial, and because the purpose of the transfer is to preserve the display
of the cross.  Given the transfer statute’s fundamental inadequacy as a105
remedy for the Establishment Clause violation, Justice Stevens concluded that
there is no need to remand to the district court.106
III. ANALYSIS
In deciding Salazar v. Buono and determining the constitutionality of
such transactions, the Court was faced with weighing two major competing
interests: upholding and recognizing the continuing importance of the
Establishment Clause, versus the potential implications that the ruling could
have on the ability to transfer and control property. This comment argues that,
while the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit rationales both have merit, the
Court should have affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in this particular case.
In his dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit’s most recent Buono
decision, Justice O’Scannlain expressed a great deal of concern over the
majority’s ruling.  One of Justice O’Scannlain’s concerns is that the Ninth107
Circuit inappropriately expanded the scope of the “unusual circumstances”
test by holding that the government has maintained or will maintain or support
the Sunrise Rock cross after the land transfer despite the lack of any evidence
indicating that this is the case.  Furthermore, Justice O’Scannlain criticizes108
the majority’s opinion on the basis that it creates a possibility in which a
private citizen’s rights may be infringed upon simply because of the fact that
his land was publicly owned in the past.  Essentially, the Justice’s argument109
in his dissent is that the majority’s ruling could harm potential recipients of
land in these types of transactions, because they may be forced to suffer the
consequences of the government’s constitutional violation long after the
government’s endorsement of religion has ended.
Based on the facts of the Buono case, it is apparent that the Ninth Circuit
did not inappropriately expand upon the unusual circumstances test. The
transaction at issue in Buono was suspicious in a number of respects. Aside
from the reasons cited by the Ninth Circuit, such as the reversionary interest
in the land held by the government, and the bypassing of required
105. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1832–33.
106. Id. at 1841.
107. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008).
108. Id. at 763.
109. Id. at 764.
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administrative procedures,  the timing of the transaction should have raised110
questions. In 1999, prior to the initial complaints about the cross, a Utah
resident and retired NPS employee inquired with the NPS about the possibility
of erecting a stupa (a dome-shaped Buddhist shrine) on a rock outcrop located
near the cross.  The NPS quickly informed the individual that it was111
prohibited by agency regulations from installing any type of religious symbol
on the publicly-owned land, and that it would remove the cross.  Shortly112
thereafter, Congress passed a law prohibiting the use of government funds to
remove the cross.  Congress also passed a law that designated the cross as113
a national memorial to veterans,  despite the immensely diverse ethnic and114
religious population in the United States, and the fact that thirty-two percent
of the current U.S. military does not identify themselves as belonging to a
Christian faith.115
Furthermore, the designation of the cross as a national memorial made it
one of only forty-nine such memorials in the entire United States.  The116
designation of this small, little-known cross, located in a very remote area and
seen by few, as a national memorial when such a designation is relatively rare
should have further raised suspicions about the federal government’s motives.
The combination of all these factors should have been more than enough to,
at a minimum, raise suspicion that the government is transferring land for the
sole purpose of circumventing the Establishment Clause. While
“[u]nusual circumstances that will invalidate a sale include (1) ‘a sale to a straw
purchaser’ leaving the public entity ‘with continuing power to exercise the duties of
ownership,’ (2) ‘a sale that does not comply with’ applicable law governing the sale of
land by a public entity, or (3) a sale well below fair market value resulting in a gift to a
religious organization,” courts have held that “[a]ll of these unusual circumstances need
not exist to invalidate a sale and a court may also consider the existence of other unusual
circumstances in this analysis.”117
110. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
111. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008).
112. Id.
113. Id. See Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 133, 114 Stat. 2763A-230 (2000):
None of the funds in this or any other Act may be used by the Secretary of the Interior to remove
the five-foot-tall white cross located within the boundary of the Mojave National Preserve in
southern California first erected in 1934 by the Veterans of Foreign Wars along Cima Road
approximately 11 miles south of Interstate 15. § 113 (emphasis added).
114. Merriam, supra note 61.
115. Drazin, supra note 7 (eleven percent of current active members of the military say they belong
to a non-Christian faith, while twenty-one percent are atheists or report no religion).
116. Id.
117. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178–79 (C.D. Cal. 2005), citing Mercier, 395 F.3d
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The Seventh Circuit’s unusual circumstances test appears to be an
appropriate test in analyzing the validity of these types of transactions.
However, the test is completely ineffective unless Courts apply a level of
scrutiny to the extent that the Ninth Circuit has. The circumstances in the
Buono line of cases were clearly unusual enough to warrant increased
scrutiny. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has not inappropriately expanded the test;
they have simply carried it out more effectively than the Seventh Circuit and
the adherents to the Seventh Circuit approach.
Critics of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Buono v. Kempthorne also point
to the potentially harmful effect that such a ruling could have on the
beneficiaries of land in such cases.  This argument, while valid, tends to118
exaggerate the potential harm to private citizen’s rights, while de-emphasizing
the importance of the separation between church and state. In cases like these,
the private citizen often has limited rights as a result of the transaction
anyway. “The private beneficiary of the land transfer performs functions
normally under the umbrella of the state.”  In the Buono line of cases, for119
example, the terms of the conveyance include a condition that the land, as well
as the replica cross and commemorative plaque purchased with government
funds, be maintained as a memorial by the recipient, the Veterans of Foreign
Wars.  In cases like these, although the transaction removed the government120
from legal ownership of the land containing the religious symbol,
“government action persists in substance, as does the expression of a patently
religious symbol on what is perceived to be public land.”  Thus, rights of the121
private parties involved in these types of cases, which generally only serve as
a “mask” for government action, are actually not encroached upon.
Nonetheless, this is an issue that should be considered by the Court when
analyzing government land transfers to private entities. If a particular
transaction in which a private entity purchases land from the federal
government creates a significantly onerous burden on the private entity due
to the government’s First Amendment violation, such a result should be
factored into whether the sale is an effective remedy.
at 702.
118. See generally David Brewer, Comment, A Cross in the Road: Salazar v. Buono and the Circuit
Divide on the Establishment Clause Remedial Question, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 813, 844 (2009).
119. David C. Peet, Comment, Deed of Mistrust? The Use of Land Transfers to Evade the
Establishment Clause, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 129, 147 (2009).
120. Id. at 147.
121. Id. at 151.
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Some commentators also argue that the Seventh Circuit’s approach to
cases involving the transfer of land to a private entity is preferable to the
Ninth Circuit’s because it affords local governments flexibility to remedy
Establishment Clause violations with creative solutions.  Municipalities122
today are faced with increasing complexities of governance as America
continues to become more religiously and culturally diverse.  The Seventh123
Circuit, by presuming that such transactions are an effective remedy to
Establishment Clause violations, allows governments to come up with
solutions other than the “take-it-or-leave-it approach to the religious
display.”  This all or nothing approach is often undesirable, as questions of124
religious displays can generate a tremendous amount of emotion, and thus the
removal or keeping of a symbol may create a volatile situation.125
There is a problem with this argument, however. Increasing the
government’s flexibility in crafting solutions to Establishment Clause
violations would inevitably lead to a potential increase in the government’s
ability to act favorably toward a particular religion. The government should
only be permitted to engage in land transfers to private citizens in the most
obviously constitutional situations. Following the Seventh Circuit approach
would allow governments to engage in different types of transactions that
would increase the potential for abuse. Furthermore, allowing governments
flexibility in these types of transactions could have additional negative policy
implications. For one, “[a]ny entity desirous of erecting a permanent religious
symbol on public land would have what amounts to a court-established right
to a piece of the commons.”  This could open the door for unpopular126
religious groups to freely erect symbols on public land. Essentially, “carving
out public lands into private parcels to appease particular religious groups
seems more likely to potentially invite religious tension rather than alleviate
it.”127
Based on the aforementioned factors, the Supreme Court should have
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Buono v. Kempthorne. The
circumstances surrounding the transfer of land from a government entity to a
private one need to be thoroughly analyzed, and the particular facts of each
and every situation need to be taken into account. In addition to the typical
122. Brewer, supra note 118, at 844.
123. Id. at 846.
124. Id. at 844.
125. Id. at 846.
126. Peet, supra note 120, at 154.
127. Id. at 155.
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factors examined by the Seventh Circuit in determining whether “unusual
circumstances” surrounded a transaction, courts should also take into account
factors such as how long the religious symbol in question has been at a
particular site, the community attitudes about the symbol, and other factors
that may affect a government’s tendency to engage in “sham” transactions.
These types of factors further help to illuminate the government’s rationale
behind transferring land to a private entity, and thus help to determine the
legitimacy of such transactions.
For example, if a particular religious monument has been an important
part of a community for several decades, as the cross at issue in Salazar v.
Buono was, and is held by the community members to be an important aspect
of the community’s identity, a sale of the land containing the monument by the
local government to a private entity should be viewed with additional scrutiny.
Such a transaction should be subject to additional scrutiny because it would
likely be in the local government’s best interest to maintain the monument,
due to its popularity with citizens. In such a case, therefore, the government’s
tendency to engage in a “sham” transaction in order to circumvent the
Establishment Clause would be at its highest. If it is not in the economic
interest of the governmental entity, but merely a way to overcome an
Establishment Clause violation, such a transfer should be found to be invalid.
Additionally, the Court should assess the level of actual harm that
prohibiting a transfer of land from the government to a private entity would
truly have on the private actor. For example, the actual financial burden that
the prohibition would create for the private entity, as well as the level of
inconvenience of having to bear the burden of the ramifications for the
government’s violations, should be weighed in these types of cases. It will be
up to the reviewing court to examine these transactions on a case-by-case
basis and determine whether the interests of the private entity are affected in
a significant enough way to justify the transfer of the land from a
governmental entity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause retains an important role in our society today.
With the ever-increasing religious diversity of the United States comes the
continued importance of a strong prohibition against the establishment of law
pertaining to religion or the endorsement by the government of any particular
religion. While there are many significant interests to be considered in
determining the validity of transactions involving the sale of public land
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containing a religious symbol to a private entity, the separation of church and
state should remain the strongest.
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Salazar v. Buono does not
absolutely foreclose the possibility of land transfers as an effective way to
overcome an Establishment Clause violation. The opinion correctly recognizes
that a complete eradication of religious symbols in public places is neither
practical nor required. As the Supreme Court demonstrated in Lynch v.
Donnelly, there are countless examples in everyday life of the intersection of
government and religion.  Governmental entities have proclaimed days with128
religious origins, such as Thanksgiving and Christmas, to be national holidays,
in which federal employees are released from their duties and are paid with
federal funds.  The Pledge of Allegiance, the National Anthem, and even the129
currency of the United States contain references to God.  National galleries,130
maintained with government support, contain many masterpieces which
contain religious messages.  In other words, a total denial by the Courts that131
there is interaction between the government and religion is neither realistic nor
desirable.
However, even given these principles, the Supreme Court should have
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Buono v. Kempthorne and upheld the
ruling that the government’s action was unconstitutional. While the sale of
land can be an effective remedy for Establishment Clause violations, these
types of transactions must be viewed with more scrutiny than the Seventh
Circuit, and the plurality in Salazar, has viewed them with up to this point.
These types of transfers should only be allowed in situations where any
“unusual circumstances” surrounding the sale are absent, and where the
potential detriment to the private entity resulting from the denial of the
transfer substantially outweighs any First Amendment concerns. The facts of
Salazar v. Buono clearly suggest that the land transfer failed to adequately
remedy the Establishment Clause violation, because of the presence of
unusual circumstances and minimal detriment to the private entity receiving
the land. The wall between church and state should remain as strong as
possible, but as a practical matter cannot be completely impenetrable.
However, Courts should not recognize this principle at the expense of the
Establishment Clause, as the plurality did in Salazar v. Buono.
128. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
